THE Melaka High Court’s refusal to immediately record a proposed RM1.7 mil settlement involving a severely disabled road accident victim was, in my view, a legally principled decision.
Free Malaysia Today reported that Sultan Nur Mohamad suffered severe traumatic brain injuries and permanent disabilities following a motorcycle accident on March 2, 2024. His wife, Sharifah Nizamuddin, acted as his litigation representative.
The Sessions Court later awarded Sultan RM1.87 mil in damages, interest and costs after finding the motorcycle rider wholly liable and the registered owner vicariously liable. During the appeal, however, the parties agreed to settle for RM1.7 mil, with a further RM170,000 proposed as costs.
Judicial Commissioner K. Raja Segaran declined simply to endorse the agreement.
That was the correct approach.
This was not an ordinary commercial settlement between parties capable of protecting their own interests. Sultan’s severe injuries meant he could not manage his affairs independently. The court therefore had a protective responsibility under the Rules of Court 2012.
Order 76 Rule 10 requires court approval for any compromise involving a person under disability, while Order 22B Rule 7 makes clear that such a settlement is not binding until approval is obtained.
The litigation representative’s consent is necessary, but it is not sufficient.
As Raja Segaran observed, the court “is not a registry of agreements.”
That principle is fundamental.
The immediate legal basis for the decision lay in the Rules of Court, although the broader constitutional commitment to protecting individual rights helps explain why vulnerable persons receive additional legal safeguards.
Judicial discretion in this context is neither arbitrary nor unlimited. It exists because the law requires judges to make an independent assessment rather than simply endorse private agreements.
The court was also justified in seeking clarification before approving the settlement.
According to FMT, the proposed RM170,000 in costs differed substantially from the RM40,608 previously awarded by the Sessions Court.
The draft consent judgment also reportedly contained inconsistencies concerning the withdrawal of the appeal, payment deadlines, enforcement and the treatment of the earlier judgment.
These circumstances do not establish misconduct by the claimant or his lawyers. They do, however, justify careful judicial scrutiny.
The central question is not whether RM1.7 mil is a large or small settlement. The court must consider whether the proposed compensation adequately protects the victim’s long-term interests, including future medical treatment, ongoing care, financial security and the consequences of abandoning an appeal.
This is precisely why the requirement for court approval matters.
If approval meant nothing more than recording an agreement already reached by representatives, the protective purpose of Order 76 Rule 10 would be substantially weakened. The rule necessarily requires independent judicial judgment.
Malaysia is not unusual in adopting this approach.
Singapore also requires court approval for settlements involving persons under disability. In England and Wales, Rule 21.10 of the Civil Procedure Rules similarly requires judicial approval for settlements involving children and protected parties.
The UK Supreme Court’s decision in Dunhill v Burgin [2014] UKSC 18 is particularly instructive. There, a settlement involving a severely injured road accident claimant had not received the required independent judicial approval.
The court emphasised that judicial scrutiny serves as an external safeguard against inappropriate settlements where claimants cannot adequately protect their own interests.
The Melaka decision reflects the same common-law principle.
Importantly, the ruling does not prevent settlement. FMT reported that the agreement remains effective pending the court’s approval. If approved, the consent order can proceed. If not, the appeal continues.
This is not judicial obstruction.
It is judicial responsibility.
The broader lesson extends beyond this single case.
Courts should never become rubber stamps for private agreements when vulnerable individuals are involved. Raja Segaran’s decision demonstrates that judicial discretion, exercised within the Rules of Court and guided by established common-law principles, strengthens rather than weakens the rule of law.
Ultimately, justice is not merely about settling disputes but also about ensuring that those who cannot protect themselves are not left without protection. ‒ Sept 18, 2026
R. Paneir Selvam is Principal Consultant at Arunachala Research & Consultancy Sdn Bhd (ARRESCON), a think tank specialising in strategic national and geopolitical analysis.
The views expressed are solely of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of Focus Malaysia.
Main image: FMT
